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Abstract
A perfectly rational decision-maker chooses the best action with the highest util-
ity gain from a set of possible actions. The optimality principles that describe
such decision processes do not take into account the computational costs of find-
ing the optimal action. Bounded rational decision-making addresses this problem
by specifically trading off information-processing costs and expected utility. In-
terestingly, a similar trade-off between energy and entropy arises when describing
changes in thermodynamic systems. This similarity has been recently used to
describe bounded rational agents. Crucially, this framework assumes that the en-
vironment does not change while the decision-maker is computing the optimal
policy. When this requirement is not fulfilled, the decision-maker will suffer inef-
ficiencies in utility, that arise because the current policy is optimal for an environ-
ment in the past. Here we borrow concepts from non-equilibrium thermodynamics
to quantify these inefficiencies and illustrate with simulations its relationship with
computational resources.
1 Introduction
Classical decision-making theories assume that a perfect rational decision-maker should always pick
the option with the best expected utility, thus ignoring the computational costs that the search for the
best option entails. Experiments in decision-making under uncertainty have been shown to violate
these classical theories [1]. As a consequence many alternative explanations have been proposed to
explain, at first sight, this irrational behaviour [2, 3, 4, 5]. A recent theory of bounded rationality for
decision-making has been proposed that takes into account the computational cost of the search of
the optimal policy. Similar ideas are getting increasing interest and being used in different fields as
control , robotics and machine learning [6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The theory of bounded rationality shares the same mathematical framework used in statistical
physics to describe changes in thermodynamic systems [3, 11, 12]. In the same way a ther-
modynamic system trades-off its internal energy with an entropic cost—that is higher for high
temperature—a bounded rational agent trades-off the expected utility of a computed policy with
a information-processing cost—that is higher for low rationality. Furthermore, bounded rationality
takes into account model uncertainty, meaning that the model used to describe the world or policy
is wrong or partially incorrect, thus allowing deviations from this model [13, 14].
However, the theory assumes that the utility function shown to the agent remains unchanged for the
time that the agent spends computing until he samples his optimal action. An interesting problem
arises when the agent is facing changing environments in such a way that the he cannot compute
the optimal policy instantaneously but he still can use the previously computed policy to make a
decision. In the present paper we look at the inefficiencies in utility gains due to non-optimal policy
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changes. In particular, we consider the special case where the used policy lags behind the optimal
policy. This could be useful to explain human decision-making in fast changing environments with
time-scales close to reaction times but also it serves as a first step towards having a measure of
inefficiency of mechanistic systems that can use computational resources and they have to allocate
them optimally.
2 Decision-making with information-processing costs
The deliberation process of a bounded rational decision maker consists in the transformation of a
prior probabilistic model or policy p0(x) of an action x ∈ X into a posterior policy p1(x) taking
into account the utility function ∆U(x) and the transformation cost from the prior distribution to
the posterior distribution. This trade-off is characterized by the free energy difference (FED)1 [3].
∆F [p] =
∑
x
p(x)∆U(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected utility under p
− 1
β
∑
x
p(x) log
p(x)
p0(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Transformation cost
. (1)
The first term is the expected utility under policy p and the second term is a transformation cost
measured by the Kullback-Leibler divergence (DKL(p||p0) =
∑
x p(x) log
p(x)
p0(x)
) between an arbi-
trary distribution p and the equilibrium distribution p0. The resource parameter β sets the relative
importance between the transformation cost and the maximization of ∆U(x). The optimal policy
p1(x) for β > 0 can be found by the maximization of the FED that is p1(x) = argmaxp ∆F [p].
However, for β < 0, 1βDKL(p||p0) is concave and thus the optimal policy is found by minimizing the
FED that is p1(x) = argminp ∆F [p]. For β = 0, p1(x) = p0(x). The interpretation of positive β is
that the agent finds himself in a collaborative or exploitable environment, whereas for negative β he
finds himself in an adversarial environment with presumed rationality β. The solution for positive
or negative β is the same:
p1(x) =
1
Z
p0(x)e
β∆U(x) (2)
with partition function Z =
∑
x p0(x)e
β∆U(x).
Replacing the non-optimal policy p for the optimal policy p1 in Equation 1 the free energy difference
becomes
∆F =
∑
x
p1(x)∆U(x)− 1
β
∑
x
p1(x) log
p1(x)
p0(x)
=
1
β
logZ (3)
It will be useful in later parts of the paper to re-express the optimal posterior distribution of Equa-
tion 2 in the following terms:
p1(x) = p0(x)e
β∆U(x)−β∆F (4)
and
∆U(x) =
1
β
log
p1(x)
p0(x)
+ ∆F (5)
In summary, the process of decision-making proceeds as follows. At the beginning the agent finds
himself in an environment where he is optimal given his computational constraints with the policy
p0. Then he experiences a change in the environment, and thus he observes a change in the utility
1 Our free energy difference corresponds, in statistical physics, to the negative free energy difference be-
cause of the use of energies (costs) instead of utilities.
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function measured by ∆U(x). Given this change in the environment the previous policy p0 is
not optimal anymore and then he needs to compute the new optimal policy p1 given the resources
β. In order to do so, the process of computation requires the maximization of the free energy of
Equation 1. An assumption of this process is that if the environment changes instantaneously, the
change in utility ∆U(x) has to remain the same during the whole computation and it can only change
again when the agent has sampled an action from the already computed optimal policy.
Importantly, if this assumption is not fulfilled the agent is not applying the optimal policy. In the next
section we are going to give the thermodynamic interpretation of the above framework for decision-
making, and moreover we are going to go further by looking at non-equilibrium thermodynamics
that will serve as a motivation for the description of the aforementioned inefficiencies in decision-
making with information-processing constraints.
3 Non-equilibrium thermodynamics
Time evolution of a thermodynamic system can be described by a trajectory in phase space that
specifies the position and velocity of all particles at any given time. When some external parameters
λ of such a system vary with time (e.g. a change in a magnetic potential or position of the wall of
a piston) work is being applied to the system and it will evolve along a path from an initial state
A to a final state B. When the change in the parameters is done infinitely slowly the ensemble
of microstates at any specified time can be described by an equilibrium distribution and the work
performed on such a system is equivalent to the free energy difference W = ∆F = FB − FA.
However, when the parameters are applied in finite time, the work performed on the system will
depend on the initial microscopic conditions and will be on average higher than the free energy
difference [15]
W ≥ ∆F. (6)
In this case, when changing λ the ensemble of microstates cannot be described by an equilibrium
distribution and then it is said that the system is in non-equilibrium.
We can define the equilibrium distribution when the external parameter is held fixed. Without loss
of generality, if the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] controls a switching process between an initial potential2
UA (λ = 0) and the final potential UB (λ = 1), the equilibrium distribution for any intermediate λ
can be described with the Boltzmann distribution
pλ(x) =
1
Zλ
e−βUλ(x) (7)
where Uλ(x) = UA(x) + λ(UB(x) − UA(x)). In statistical physics, it is well known that the
Boltzmann distribution solves the variational problem of minimizing the free energy F = U − TS
that is a trade-off between the internal energy of the system and an entropic cost times a temperature.
More formally, for any given external parameter λ the Boltzmann distribution satisfies:
pλ(x) = argmin
p
Fλ[p] = argmin
p
∑
x
p(x)Uλ(x) +
1
β
∑
x
p(x) log p(x)
where β = 1/kT , k is the Boltzmann constant and T the temperature. Note that the free energy
can also be expressed as Fλ = − 1β logZλ and thus it is only defined in equilibrium states, so for an
arbitrary p, Fλ[p] is in fact a non-equilibrium free energy.
Importantly, when the switching is produced in finite time, the system will find itself in a non-
equilibrium state that cannot be described by Equation 7. Furthermore, the work applied to the
system is going to be higher than the free energy difference. The average extra work applied to the
system is
Wdiss = W −∆F.
2A potential in physics can be thought as a negative utility function in decision-making
3
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When the switching process ends at λ = 1 the system will start to equilibrate towards the equilibrium
distribution pB under the potential UB . During this process the extra work Wdiss will be dissipated
in form of heat to the environment at temperature T and the non-equilibrium free energy difference
∆F [p] := FB [p] − F [pA] of the system will be minimized towards the equilibrium free energy
difference ∆F , assuming that the system was initially in equilibrium. The dissipated work, in other
words, is a measure of the inefficiency of a process that drives the system from an equilibrium state
A to another equilibrium state B.
Recent advances in non-equilibrium thermodynamics have shown a remarkable fact, that is trans-
forming the inequality of Equation 6 into an equality (called Jarzynski equality [16]):
e−β∆F = e−βW (8)
where the over-line denotes an average over all possible realizations of a process that drives the
system from an equilibrium state A to, in general, a non-equilibrium state B, and W denotes the
work spent in such a process. Specifically, the above equality says that, no matter how the driving
process is implemented, we can specify equilibrium quantities from work fluctuations in the non-
equilibrium process. Or in other words, this equality connects non-equilibrium thermodynamics
with equilibrium thermodynamics. We will borrow the previous results to describe inefficiencies in
the process of decision-making in the next section.
4 Inefficiencies due to lag in the policy
In this section we are going to use the aforementioned non-equilibrium results from statistical
physics to describe inefficiencies due to not using an optimal policy. We are going to consider
two simple scenarios where the change in utility function ∆U(x) is applied instantaneously or in
N timesteps. In both cases, we assume that the agent takes one timestep to notice the change in
utility function, then samples an action from the previous policy and finally computes the optimal
policy instantaneously. Due to this lag in the optimal policy the amount of expected utility gained
by the agent will not be the optimal one (where the optimal one is the free energy difference) thus
having inefficiencies. We will quantify these inefficiencies similarly to the dissipated work in non-
equilibrium thermodynamics.
4.1 One-step scenario
In the one-step scenario the agent has to sample only one action. At the beginning of the process
he is using an initial policy p0(x) that is optimal for the utility function U0(x) given his resources
β. Then there is an external change switching the utility function from U0(x) to U1(x) such that it
provokes a ∆U(x) from the point of view of the agent. Importantly, at the moment of this increase
in the utility function he is still using his previous policy p0. This process is described with the
following table:
Timestep t 0 1
Utility function U0(x) U1(x)
Policy p0(x) p0(x)
The average in expected utility difference from t = 0 to t = 1 is
Unet =
∑
x
p0(x)∆U(x)
This quantity is the average net utility that the agent gains using the non-optimal policy. The average
dissipated or “wasted” utility because not using the optimal policy is the difference between the
optimal increase in utility ∆F and the net utility Unet:
4
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Udiss := ∆F − Unet (9)
= ∆F −
∑
x
p0(x)∆U(x)
= ∆F −
∑
x
p0(x)
[
1
β
log
p1(x)
p0(x)
+ ∆F
]
(10)
=
1
β
∑
x
p0(x) log
p0(x)
p1(x)
. (11)
Equation 10 is obtained by using Equation 5 and the step from 10 to 11 is done noticing that ∆F is
a constant under the expectation over p0 and cancels out.
Apart from the description of the inefficiencies derived above, the Jarzysnki-like equality for deci-
sion making can be recovered in the following way. From Equation 4 we can re-arrange the terms
to have:
p1(x)
p0(x)
eβ∆F = eβ∆U(x)
Doing an expectation over the initial conditions p0 yields
∑
x
p0(x)
p1(x)
p0(x)
eβ∆F =
∑
x
p0(x)e
β∆U(x)
where the left term is a constant under the expectation and the right term is actually the average over
all possible realizations of the process, thus giving:
eβ∆F =eβ∆U(x)
The interpretation of this result in decision-making is that the utility gains along the path of actions
taken by an agent, gives us information about the optimal utility gains given his computational
resources.
4.2 N-step scenario
Consider now that the agent is exposed to the same increase in utility ∆U(x), but in N timesteps.
After every timestep the agent is able to notice the increase in the utility function ∆U(x)N but he is
still using the previous policy. Next, he computes the optimal policy for this increase in utility. The
following table describes this process:
Timestep 0 1 2 ... t ... N
Utility function U0(x) U1(x) U2(x) ... Ut(x) ... UN (x)
Policy p0(x) p0(x) p1(x) ... pt−1(x) ... pN−1(x)
where now Ut(x) = U0(x) + tN∆U(x) for t ∈ N : 0 ≤ t ≤ N and the optimal policy at timestep t
builds on the previous policy thus yielding:
pt(x) =
pt−1(x)e
β
N ∆U(x)∑
x′ pt−1(x′)e
β
N ∆U(x
′)
(12)
for t > 0. The dissipated utility at timestep t > 0 is
Udiss(t) =
1
β
∑
x
pt−1(x) log
pt−1(x)
pt(x)
(13)
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and the overall dissipated utility for the whole process is
UNdiss =
N∑
t=1
Udiss(t) =
1
β
N∑
t=1
∑
x
pt−1(x) log
pt−1(x)
pt(x)
(14)
Similar to Equation 9 we can define the net utility gain for the N-step scenario as follows:
UNnet := ∆F − UNdiss (15)
Note that the average dissipation is lower when more time-steps are used for the change in the
potential
UNdiss ≥ UN+1diss
.
We recover the one-step scenario for N = 1, corresponding to an instantaneous change in utility.
Similar to a quasi-static change in a thermodynamic system, for N → ∞, we get an infinitely
slow change in utility, thus UNdiss → 0 and then the net utility equals the free energy difference
UNnet = ∆F .
Jarzynski derivation
In a N-step scenario, similarly to Equation 5, we have that:
∆F =
1
N
[∆U(x1) + ∆U(x2)...+ ∆U(xt) + ...+ ∆U(xN )]−
− 1
β
log
p1(x1)
p0(x1)
− 1
β
log
p2(x2)
p1(x2)
...− 1
β
log
pt(xt)
pt−1(xt)
...− 1
β
log
pN (xN )
pN−1(xN )
=
1
N
∑
t
∆U(xt)− 1
β
N∑
t=1
log
pt(xt)
pt−1(xt)
where the sub-index denotes the timestep. With this relationship the exponential of the free energy
difference is
exp (β∆F ) = exp
(
β
N
N∑
t
∆U(xt)−
N∑
t=1
log
pt(xt)
pt−1(xt)
)
= exp
(
β
N
N∑
t
∆U(xt)
)
N∏
t
pt−1(xt)
pt(xt)
where
∏N
t pt−1(xt) is the probability of the “path” of actions and
1
N
∑N
t ∆U(xt) is the utility gain
along the path exactly as the Jarzynski formulation. So by doing the expectation over
∏
t pt(xt) we
have:
exp (β∆F ) = exp
(
β
N
N∑
t
∆U(xt)
)
analogous to the one-step scenario.
5 Simulations
In the following simulations we are going to illustrate how the number of steps and the resources
affect the dissipated utility. Consider the situation where the agent can choose between two possible
6
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A B
C D
Figure 1: Illustration of the dependence on β for A: the dissipated utility B: the free energy differ-
ence C: the net utility D: the sum of the previous quantities for every timestep. See Section 5 for a
detailed description.
actions x ∈ {a, b} and he observes a ∆U(x) = (−2, 5). Importantly, this change in the utility
function is made in several timesteps, allowing him to recompute the optimal policy at the end of
every timestep. In particular, for this simulation the total number of timesteps is set to N = 4. The
initial policy of the agent is just p0(x) = (0.5, 0.5).
In this particular scenario, we show in Figure 1(A-C) the different values of the dissipated utility,
free energy difference and the net utility with respect to the rationality parameter β. At the first
timestep the agent is using the policy p0 that does not depend on β so the net utility is the same for
all β—see Figure 1C. The increase in free energy is higher for higher β in the different timesteps—
see Figure 1B. In the limit case of β → 0, the agent has no resources to change his policy and then
the only gain in utility is the net utility. The dissipated utility for the first timestep increases with
increasing β because it is a measure of inefficiency compared to the free energy difference. Notice
that for this timestep, the dissipated utility is unavoidable because the agent just uses p0. However,
in the next timesteps the agent can actually use his resources to compute the optimal policy—with a
lag of one timestep— and by doing so, reduce the dissipated utility. For high β = 5, the dissipated
utility is almost only present in the first timestep because the agent with such a high rationality is
able to quickly adopt the best policy in the second timestep, and thus being already optimal for later
timesteps. This happens because we imposed a linear grow in ∆U(x) and thus best policy for the
second timestep is also the best policy for later timesteps. In general situations, this will not happen
and the agent could, in principle, have high inefficiencies (high dissipated utility) even though he
may have high rationality β. In Figure 1D we show the sum of utilities for all timesteps and we see
that the total net utility is less than the free energy difference plateaus for high β only due to the
inefficiencies in the first timestep.
In Figure 2 we show the sum over all timesteps of the net utility, the dissipated utility and the
free energy difference for the whole process exactly as in Figure 1D but now also varying the total
number of timesteps N . Note that the free energy difference is independent of N . We observe
that for higher N the more similar the surface of net utility is to the free energy difference. In the
particular, in an infinitely slow change of utility, or in other words when N → ∞, the net utility
would be exactly the free energy difference. An instant switching of ∆U(x) would correspond to
the case of N = 1, where the agent is the most inefficient.
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Figure 2: Dependence of β and the total number of timesteps N for the sum over all timesteps of
(from left to right): the dissipated utility, the free energy difference and the net utility. See Section 5
for a detailed description.
6 Conclusions
We described a framework of decision-making under information-processing costs and looked at the
analogies it has with the evolution of thermodynamic systems into equilibrium. We borrowed con-
cepts from non-equilibrium thermodynamics and applied them to describe inefficiencies in decision-
making due the use of non-optimal policies when the decision-maker cannot adapt perfectly to a fast
changing environment. We showed an equivalent interpretation of the Jarzynski equality in thermo-
dynamics for decision-making that allows relating fluctuations in the possibly suboptimal achieved
net utility of an agent to the optimally achievable utility given by the free energy difference. The
main contribution of this work is to quantify the inefficiencies that arise in bounded rational decision-
makers when the environment changes faster than the agent can respond. These inefficiencies could
be irrelevant in slow-changing environments but of a greater importance in fast-changing environ-
ments as because the computed policies could differ in great deal with the optimal policies.
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